Join the Union and be Safe : The Effects of Unionisation on Occupational Safety and Health in the European Union by Economou, Athina & Theodossiou, Ioannis
ISSN 0143-4543 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Join the Union and be Safe; The Effects of 
Unionisation on Occupational Safety and Health in 
the European Union 
 
By 
 
 
Athina Economou and Ioannis Theodossiou 
 
 
Discussion Paper 2011-06 
November 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editor: Dr W David McCausland 
www.abdn.ac.uk/business/ 
 1 
Join the Union and be Safe; The Effects of Unionisation on 
Occupational Safety and Health in the European Union 
 
ATHINA ECONOMOU* and IOANNIS THEODOSSIOU** 
 
 
Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of unionisation on fatal and non-fatal work accidents after 
controlling for the country GDP, using a panel sample of 10 European Union countries, for the period 
1982-2006. The study takes into account the time persistence in work injuries and the endogenous 
nature of the work injuries – union density relationship, by using GMM regression models. After 
controlling for endogeneity, both fatal and non-fatal work injuries decrease as union density increases. 
This finding has important implications for the design of OHS and industrial relations policies.  
 
 
Keywords: Work accidents, Unemployment, GMM   
JEL: J28, J81, C33 
 
* (Corresponding Author) Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece, tel: 0030 
24210 74670, email: aeconomou@econ.uth.gr. 
** Professor, Department of Economics, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB24 3QY, Scotland, UK, email: 
theod@abdn.ac.uk 
Acknowledgements: Thanks go to the participants of the ‘Health and Work’ Organised Session  (2011) of the 
Scottish Economic Society 2011 Annual Conference, Perth, Scotland for helpful comments. The financial 
support of the European Commission is gratefully acknowledged (HEALTHatWORK project) - 7th Framework 
Programme "THEME [HEALTH-2007-4.2-3] Grant agreement no: 200716. 
 2 
Join the Union and be Safe; The Effects of Unionisation on Occupational 
Safety and Health in the European Union 
 
Introduction 
Health and safety at the workplace plays an important role in the well being of the 
employed population. Although work injuries exhibit downward trends the last decade, they 
still cause significant economic, social and emotional costs to the employees’ involved and 
negative externalities to their families as well (European Agency for Health and Safety at 
Work, 2001).  
Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2011) provide a detailed literature review of the OHS which 
reveals that labour unions play an important role in determining the framework of workplace 
health and safety policy initiatives. The literature indicates that labor unions use their political 
influence and engage actively through collective bargaining, representation in health and 
safety committees and the undertaking of relevant actions, in enhancing workplace safety 
(Donado, 2007). Hence, in industries with strong unionisation presence, work injuries appear 
to be lower in comparison to industries with weaker union presence (Donado, 2007). 
Furthermore, Freeman (1994) argues that unions contribute to the improvement of working 
conditions, obtain higher compensation benefits for employees who suffered work-related 
health problems, and in general, represent effectively the employees’ interests regarding 
health and safety at the workplace (Donado, 2007; Fenn and Ashby, 2004; Hirsch et al., 
1997; Morse et al., 2003). Siebert and Wei (1994) provide evidence that unionised workers 
experience lower fatal injury rates. A more recent study of Litwin (2000) found that the 
presence of unions in the British labour market contribute to the reduction of work injuries. 
However, a number of studies provide evidence that increased unionisation is associated 
with higher workplace injuries (Donado, 2007; Fishback, 1986). In line with the above, 
Donado (2007), Fenn and Ashby (2004), Nichols et al. (2007) show that unionisation affects 
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workplace injuries, but workplace injuries may also affect the degree of unionisation since 
high accidents rates may motivate workers to organise  in unions in order to protect 
themselves from the hazardous working conditions. Indeed, the evidence indicate that 
workers who face increased hazards at work voice their concerns by participating in union 
activity, as a response to the hazardous job conditions (Hirsch and Berger, 2001; Robinson, 
1990).   
Yet, Donado (2007) failed to provide evidence of a simultaneous relationship between 
unionisation and work injuries. He attributes the observed increased work injury rates in 
unionised sectors to behavioral issues and he argues that the presence of a union in an 
establishment is accompanied by increased safety measures because individual workers tend 
to underestimate the true job hazards, and thus experience higher work accident rates, than 
when a union is involved. Donado (2007) utilised GMM regression to examine the 
endogenous nature of work injuries – unionisation. He used as identifying restrictions the past 
values and the past differenced values of union indicators on the assumption that union 
actions regarding occupational health and safety continue to influence the likelihood of work 
injuries at subsequent years.  
Nichols et al. (2007) argued that unionisation can reduce work injuries in combination 
with the participation of union members health and safety committees at the establishment 
level. The above findings are in line with Reilly et al. (1991), who argues that lower injury 
rates are observed in plants where union representatives participate in the occupational safety 
and health committees compared to plans where unions are not represented in such 
committees.  
In addition, Donado (2007), Fenn and Ashby (2004), Morse et al. (2003), Nichols et al. 
(2007) find that  the report rate of work injuries is higher in workplaces with strong union 
presentation and this might bias upwards the effects of unionization on OHS. Fenn and 
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Ashby (2004) provide corroborating evidence indicating that the higher is the proportion of 
unionized workers in an establishment, the higher would be the risk of reported injuries or 
illnesses. They argue that highly unionised enterprises show high reporting of injuries at 
work, since they enjoy higher compensation due to the union representation. 
The present study investigates the effect of unionisation on work-related injury rates using 
a panel of ten European Union countries during the period 1982-2006. The degree of 
unionisation is approximated by the union density index. In order to take into account the 
time persistence in work injuries and the endogenous nature of the work injuries – 
unionisation relationship, GMM regression techniques are utilised. Furthermore, since Boone 
and van Ours (2002), Davies et al. (2009), Catalano (1979), Sasaki (2010), Steele (1974), 
Ussif (2004) show that occupational accidents and injuries rates are affected by the 
macroeconomic conditions and the business cycle, a proxy for these conditions (real GDP per 
capita) is included in the regression. The study shows that after controlling for endogeneity 
and time persistence, both fatal and non-fatal work injuries tend to decrease as union density 
increases, indicating the protective role of unions on occupational safety and health. 
 
The Dataset 
The data used in this study is a panel of 10 European Union countries (Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK) for the time period 1982-2006. 
Data on fatal and non-fatal work accidents and employee population are drawn from the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) database (LABORSTA). The variables to be 
explained are therefore
1
:   
 
- Total fatal injury rates per 100,000 employees 
                                                          
1
 Data on fatal and non-fatal injuries disaggregated by industrial sector are also available at ILO database. 
Unfortunately, the increased missing values on the employee population per industry and union density, did not 
allow exploitation of this information. 
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- Total non-fatal injury rates per 100,000 employees 
  
 The independent variables of interest are as follows: 
 
- Union density 
- GDP per capita (in PPP) 
 
 The data on real GDP per capita are derived from the European Database ‘Health for All’ 
of the World Health Organization (WHO). Data on trade union density (the ratio of wage and 
salary earners that are trade union members divided by the total number of wage and salary 
earners) are drawn from the Annual Labour Force Statistics of the OECD database.  
 Finally, the instrumental variable used to control for the endogenous relationship between 
work injuries and union density, is the “days lost due to strikes and lockouts per 100,000 
employees” and the information is drawn from the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
database (LABORSTA). The summary statistics of the variables included in the regressions 
are shown in Table 1.  
 
Econometric Methodology 
The methodological procedure followed is to estimate the following preliminary fixed 
effect model:   
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 ,       i t i i t i t t i tFatal Work Accidents a b GDP b Union Density b S                                                                                                                                       
(1) 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 ,        i t i i t i t t i tNon Fatal Work Accidents a b GDP b Union Density b S     
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                                                                                                                                  (2) 
 
The subscripts i and t denote the country and the year period respectively, 
ia  is the 
country-specific fixed-effects intercepts and 
tS  is the time trend variable
2
. The results for 
overall fatal and non-fatal work accidents are reported in Table 2 and 3 respectively (Column 
1).  
 In the second stage two methodological shortcomings are addressed. First the dynamic 
nature of work-related injuries is taken into account. This is an implication of the fact that the 
experience of a work related health problem at present may be affected by work related 
health condition suffered in the past. For example, musculoskeletal disorders are found to be 
the most frequently experienced work-related health problem in the European Union 
countries. After the onset of a musculoskeletal disorder (for example, low back pain) due to 
working conditions there is a high probability of recurrence of this problem (De Beek et al., 
2000). Second, the endogenous nature of the relationship between trade union density and 
work injuries should be controlled for in order to derive unbiased estimates. Both the 
dynamic relationship and endogeneity issues can be accounted for by the use of GMM 
models. The Arellano and Bond (1991) first differenced GMM estimator estimates equations 
(1) and (2) after introducing lagged values of the dependent variable and first differencing the 
variables in order to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity. The first differenced equation uses 
as instruments the past values of union density. However, past union density should continue 
to affect the growth rate of work injuries at subsequent years through the union’s actions 
regarding occupational health and safety policies and framework.  
 Arellano and Bover (1995) argue that the system GMM estimator is improved in terms of 
efficiency in comparison to the differenced GMM estimator, since the lagged variables in 
                                                          
2
 The models were also estimated with year dummies and the findings did not alter significantly. 
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levels maybe weak instruments for the differenced equation. In line with the above, the main 
model utilised in this study is the two-step system GMM estimator (the equations (1) and (2) 
respectively) to obtain the following system of two equations (one in differences, as in the 
differenced GMM estimator and one in levels) for fatal and non-fatal work injuries 
respectively (  denotes the difference operator)3: 
 
, , 1 ,
0 1 2
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3


     
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 The above systems of equations for fatal work injuries (3) and non-fatal work injuries 
respectively (4) respectively, are estimated using the two-step system GMM estimator. This 
estimator is considered to be more efficient than the differenced GMM estimator, since it 
uses as instruments the lagged differences of union density for the equation in levels and the 
lagged levels of union density for the equation in differences. The lagged values of 
2tUnion Density  and so on, are assumed to be valid instruments for the first differenced 
equation. In order to improve the performance of the model, the variable “days lost due to 
                                                          
3
 The system of equations also includes control for the time trend variable. Alternative estimation models with 
year dummies were also utilised but the models presented indicated a better fit, due to the strong collinearity of 
the year dummies with the independent variables. 
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strikes and lockouts per 100,000 employees” is also included as an instrumental variable. 
This indicator of union activity should be is correlated with union density since it is found to 
consistently affect trade union density (Lesch, 204). However, there is no a priori reason to 
expect that strike activity is related to work-related injuries. 
 In addition, the Sargan test is also used in order to check for the validity of the over-
identifying restrictions. The AR(1) and AR(2) tests are also presented since there should not 
be any evidence of second-order serial correlation while first-order serial correlation is 
expected in the model of first differences (Arellano and Bond, 1991).  
 
Regression Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables of interest at country level. Fatal 
injury rates per 100,000 workers vary greatly across countries. Sweden exhibits the lowest 
rate with only 0.28 work related fatalities per 100,000 workers. Spain faces a high incidence 
of work-related fatalities (8.38 per 100,000 workers) and of non-fatal work injuries (5,026.84 
per 100,000 workers). The lowest incidence is observed in the UK (632.91 non-fatal work 
injuries per 100,000 workers). Union density also varies across countries. Union membership 
is 10% for France, but 81% in Sweden. 
 Figures 1-3 show the mean fatal and non fatal work injury rates and union density rates for 
the countries included in the sample. A downward trend is observed for all three series. The 
mean rate of work-related fatalities exhibits a greater volatility throughout the period 1982-
2005, and it has a similar pattern to the mean of non-fatal work injuries. Interestingly, both 
series exhibit a sharp increase in the middle to late 1980’s and they drop afterwards. The 
mean union density rates are declining from 1982 up to 2005, with a sharp increase in the 
1990-1995 period. 
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 The results for the system GMM estimator for fatal and non-fatal work injuries are 
presented in Tables 2 and 3 respectively (Column 2). Table 2 presents the regression results 
for fatal work injury rates for 100,000 workers in the period 1982-2005. In the first column, 
the results from the fixed effects model are presented, and the second column presents the 
system-GMM results when endogeneity and time dependence is taken into account. The 
results of the Sargan test and the serial correlation tests (AR(1), AR(2)) are satisfactory. 
Sharp differences are observed between the results of the two estimation procedures.  While 
only economic conditions seem to affect work-related fatalities in the fixed effects model, the 
relationship becomes insignificant in the system-GMM model. In contrast, union density 
appears to reduce work fatalities, when GMM technique is utilised. An increase in union 
density is associated with a lower rate of fatal work injuries, indicating that increasing union 
density helps unions to achieve better outcomes on occupational health and safety conditions.  
 The findings are similar when one considers the effect of union density upon non-fatal 
work injuries (Table 3). Increasing union density appears to reduce non-fatal work injury 
rates (at 10% level of significance). However, the fact that the coefficient is only marginally 
statistically significant may be an outcome of the limited number of observations included in 
the sample in this case. Thus, it appears that as in the case of fatal work related accidents, 
increased union density is associated with a lower number of non-fatal work injuries. Thus, 
union activity improves working conditions and increase workplace safety. Union strength, as 
reflected in high union membership, improves the ability of unions to negotiate and achieve 
improvement of occupational safety and health at the workplace. Unions also aim to 
increasing the risk premiums, training of workers and raising compensating wage 
differentials. Furthermore, the unions encourage workers to achieve greater health 
compensations in case of work-related injuries (Litwin, 2000).  
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The empirical evidence on the effects of unions on occupational health and safety is 
ambiguous. Some studies report a negative relationship between union activity and fatal or 
non-fatal workplace injuries (Siebert and Wei, 1994, Litwin, 2000) whereas other studies find 
a positive relationship (Donado, 2007; Fishback, 1986). This ambiguity may be an outcome 
of the endogeneity bias (Hirsch and Berger, 2001; Robinson, 1990). This paper shows that 
the role of endogeneity and state dependence is crucial for evaluating the effect of union 
density upon workplace injuries. If endogeneity is not taken into account a positive but not 
statistically significant effect of union density on occupational health and safety is shown but 
once endogeneity is controlled for the relationship becomes negative and statistically 
significant. 
Contrary to the results obtained be the fixed effect model (column 1), the system-GMM 
model shows that non-fatal work injury rates move procyclically to economic conditions as 
approximated to country GDP. These findings suggest that during fattributed to the higher 
investment on occupational health and safety issues undertaken by employees at periods of 
economic booms. Barth et al. (2007) and Davies et al. (2009 unearth similar evidence and 
argue that during economic expansions work accidents tend to decrease. There is limited 
eempirical research on the effect of macroeconomic conditions on OHS focusing mainly on 
the non-fatal work accidents by country or by occupation (Barth et al., 2007). The findings 
are ambiguous; indicating mainly that during economic recessions work injuries tend to 
decrease (Boone and van Ours, 2002; Ussif, 2004). These findings are sensitive to the choices 
of countries or occupational sectors. For instance Song et al. (2011) suggest that the above 
inconsistency of the empirical evidence is and outcome of the sensitivity of the models to the 
choice of the time period. The present study suggests that only non-fatal work injuries are 
affected by the macroeconomic conditions. These results are in line with the findings of 
Saloniemi and Oksanen (1998) who also failed to establish an empirical relationship between 
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macroeconomic conditions and overall fatal work accidents. This is corroborated by the 
evidence offered by Davies et al. (2009) who is unable to establish a relationship between 
macroeconomic conditions anf serious workplace injuries.  
 
Conclusions  
This study attempts to provide further evidence of the effects unionisation, upon fatal and 
non fatal work accidents for ten European Union countries. The level of unionization is 
approximated by the union density rates. In doing so, this study utilizes system-GMM models 
in order to take into account the endogeneity on the work injuries-union density relationship 
and the dynamic character of work injuries. The findings of this paper suggest that both 
endogeneity and state dependence affect the relationship of interest. When both are controlled 
for, union density is conducive to reducing work place fatal and non-fatal injuries at the 
workplace. 
Overall, the results imply that Union power seems to be an important determinant for the 
success of unions in occupational health and safety negotiations. Increased membership 
improves the ability of the unions to be effective in achieving improvements on occupational 
health and safety and hence the improvement of working conditions. Therefore, policy 
makers should help and facilitate the actions of unions towards the direction of improving 
workplace safety, the education of both workers and employees on health and safety 
regulations, and in general, the initiatives of reducing workplace injuries. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
               Country 
 
Variables 
Austria Denmark Finland  France  Ireland  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Fatal Injury Rates per 
100,000 employees 
4.95 1.64 2.76 0.89 2.64 0.68 4.02 1.19 3.26 1.63 
Non-Fatal Injury Rates 
per 100,000 employees 
  1910.03 350.69 3090.66 764.81     
Union Density (%) 43.11 6.79 75.81 2.45 74.36 4.08 10.40 2.63 49.69 9.99 
GDP per Capita 20537.58 7101.47 21558.83 7240.06 18777.38 6393.45 19857.75 5661.74 18889.67 11197.02 
               Country 
 
Variables 
Italy  Portugal Spain  Sweden  UK 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Fatal Injury Rates per 
100,000 employees 
5.87 1.06 6.68 2.78 8.38 2.44 0.28 0.18 1.14 0.49 
Non-Fatal Injury Rates 
per 100,000 employees 
3356.84 643.63 4844.57 1315.57 5026.84 526.06 1274.43 617.06 632.91 94.33 
Union Density (%) 38.35 3.83 27.15 8.78 14.06 2.87 80.63 2.11 36.70 7.18 
GDP per Capita 19043.54 5973.48 12466.54 4883.09 14977.96 5767.34 20085.46 5641.46 18984.00 6639.99 
* Information on fatal work injuries per 100,000 employees is available for the period 1982-2005. Information on non-fatal work injuries per 100,000 employees is available 
for the years 1985-2006. 
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Figure 1. Changes in Mean Fatal Work Injury Rates Over Time, 1982-2005. 
2
3
4
5
6
M
ea
n 
Fa
ta
l I
nj
ur
ie
s 
pe
r 1
00
,0
00
 w
or
ke
rs
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
 
Figure 2. Changes in Mean Non-Fatal Work Injury Rates Over Time, 1985-2006. 
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Figure 3. Changes in Mean Union Density Rates, 1982-2005. 
40
45
50
M
ea
n 
U
ni
on
 D
en
si
ty
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
 
 17 
Table 2. The Effect of Unionization on Fatal Work Injuries, 1982-2005 
                         Dependent  
                      Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
 
 
Fatal Injuries 
FE System GMM 
GDP 
0.0002 * 
(2.78) 
0.0001 
(0.14) 
Union Density 
0.021 
(0.67) 
-0.344 * 
(-1.97) 
Fatal Injuriest-1  
0.222 
(0.61) 
Trend 
-0.247 * 
(-5.06) 
-0.186 
(-0.77) 
Constant 
3.109 ** 
(1.67) 
20.296 * 
(1.97) 
F test 
26.00  
(0.00) 
 
Wald chi2   
60.47 
(0.00) 
AR(1)  0.927 
AR(2)  0.900 
Sargan test  0.416 
Observations 240 230 
* indicates statistical significance for p<0.05 and ** indicates significance for p<0.10.  
Robust standard errors are calculated. 
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis 
Probabilities are reported for AR(1), AR(2) and Sargan test. 
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Table 3. The Effect of Unionisation on Non-Fatal Work Injuries, 1985-2006 
                         Dependent  
                      Variable 
Independent 
Variables 
 
 
Non-Fatal Injuries 
FE System GMM 
GDP 
-0.020  
(-0.89) 
-0.047 * 
(-2.63) 
Union Density 
0.001 
(0.25) 
-0.030 ** 
(-1.63) 
Non Fatal Injuriest-1  
-0.365 
(-0.55) 
Trend 
-0.006 
(-1.75) 
-0.008 
(-1.61) 
Constant 
0.465 
(1.37) 
2.314 ** 
(1.86) 
F test 
7.25 
(0.02) 
 
Wald chi2   
27.30 
(0.00) 
AR(1)  0.435 
AR(2)  0.291 
Sargan test  0.115 
Observations 154 147 
* indicates statistical significance for p<0.05 and ** indicates significance for p<0.10.  
Robust standard errors are calculated. 
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis 
Probabilities are reported for AR(1), AR(2) and Sargan test. 
Non-fatal injuries index is divided by 10,000 and GDP is divided by 1,000,000 for the easer presentation 
of the findings. 
 
